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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this survey is to examine recent developments in labor
and employment law in Florida. However, unlike other substantive areas
surveyed in this volume, a survey of labor and employment law in the State
of Florida requires a broader analysis than just Florida cases, regulations and
statutes. Florida employment and labor law is a confluence of many streams
including federal statutes and case law, federal and state governmental regu-
lations, and written policies issued by various administrative agencies
responsible for administering labor statutes.
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A Florida employer or employee, whether public or private, faced with
an employment question, must examine decisions from the United States
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Florida Supreme
Court, Florida District Courts of Appeal, federal administrative agencies,
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Department of
Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, National Labor
Relations Board, and state agencies such as Florida Department of Labor
and Security, Florida Department of Unemployment Compensation, Florida
Commission on Human Relations, and the Florida Division of Workers'
Compensation. Additionally, labor and employment law not only encom-
passes the well-known area of discrimination, but also contract and
negligence actions.
Accordingly, to help the reader effectively navigate the headwaters of
these many and varied streams of law, this article will first provide an
overview of the law that defines what labor and employment practice is
today. It will then survey the recent developments that have added new
currents to the sometimes murky water within this confluence. This article
begins with this overview and survey, so that the reader will gain a clearer
insight into the myriad of sources that comprise the area of labor and
employment law. By discussing new developments, the hope is that the
waters at the point of convergence will be clearer through an understanding
of the many streams that make up "Florida" labor and employment practice.
II. NAVIGATING THE STREAMS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Federal Statutes and Regulations
One of the problems faced by employers in complying with the myriad
of statutes and regulations governing employer/employee relations is that
some overlap, some contradict each other on their faces, and some are
applicable to certain employers and not to others. The following summariz-
es federal statutes and regulations demonstrating the problems.
1. Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")'
The ADEA prohibits age-based discrimination in various employment
practices. It covers both private and governmental employers (federal and
state), and affects employees or applicants for employment over forty years
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Florida Civil Rights Act has
no minimum age for purposes of age discrimination. See FLA. STAT. § 760.10(I)(a) (1993).
Vol. 19
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of age. The statute prohibits discrimination in all employment practices
including hiring, termination, terms and conditions of employment, and
reductions in force. The Act also prohibits an employer from retaliating
against an employee for enforcement of his or her rights under the statute.2
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 3
The ADA prohibits discrimination against any qualified individual with
a disability with regard to any term, condition, or privilege of employment.
This law sweeps very broadly. It covers both employees and applicants, and
affects them in recruiting, hiring, promotion, tenure, demotion, termination,
layoffs, pay rates, assignments, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.4
The Act simply is an extension of what began in 1973 with the Federal
Rehabilitation Act' and continued with the passage, in 1988, of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The ADA's purpose, like other legisla-
tion, is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
3. Civil Rights Act of 18667
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 protects non-white citizens from
discriminatory treatment. Section 1981 is part of the civil rights legislation
enacted by Congress following passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and provides that all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the right to make and enforce contracts,
sue, be parties, give evidence, and own property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.8
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (effective July 26, 1992). The
Act initially applied to all employers in industry affecting commerce who have 25 or more
employees. Id. § 1211 1(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). Effective July 26, 1994, the statute applies
to all employers who have 15 or more employees. Id.
4. Id. § 12112(a).
5. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988). The Florida Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1)(a) (1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
8. Id.
19941
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4. Civil Rights Act of 1991'
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, expanding the rights of
employees and providing for additional damages that might be recovered in
a discrimination lawsuit. The Act provides for a jury trial and recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages. It also sets limits between $50,000
and $300,000 maximum, depending upon the size of the employer. °
The Act also effectively overturned the Supreme Court's rulings in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio," relating to disparate impact, and
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 involving a mixed-motive case. Many
observers felt that these cases, along with others, limited employees' rights.
5. Federal Civil Service 3
Federal Civil Service employees are protected by this federal statute,
which permits their removal from employment only for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service.
6. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act ("COBRA") 14
In 1985, Congress passed this Act requiring private and public
employers of twenty or more people to provide employees with the
opportunity to continue to receive, after the occurrence of certain events, the
9. Id. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1991).
10. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1992).
11. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Section 2(2) of public law 102-166, entitled "Congressional
Findings" states that the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal Civil Rights protection. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Civil Rights Act departs from the reasoning set forth in
Price Waterhouse, which held that a defendant could avoid liability if it was capable of
demonstrating that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of
any illegal discriminatory motives. Under section 107(b) of the Act, a defendant cannot
escape liability even if demonstrated, through clear and convincing evidence, that other non-
discriminatory reasons would have resulted in the adverse employment decision.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986). COBRA is contained in both the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4980(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and in title 1, part VI of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992). Pertinent sections of COBRA are codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(k), 4980(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); and 42
U.S.C. § 300bb-I (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Vol. 19
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same group health coverage they received before the event.'5 COBRA
amended Title 1 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERI-
SA")"6 and placed certain requirements on a plan administrator to notify
each covered employee of the availability of such coverage. 7
7. Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 8
ERISA applies to private employers who maintain employment benefit
plans. It prohibits an employer from engaging in certain discriminatory
practices against an employee when that person exercises any right to which
he or she is entitled under ERISA. Covered employees generally have the
right to fair and nondiscriminatory treatment under the benefit plans.
8. Equal Pay Act 9
The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 to prohibit sex-based
discrimination in wages paid to employees, whether male or female.
9. Executive Order 1124620
Executive Order 11246 added certain protection for federal employees.
The Order prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and also applies to government contractors. 2'
10. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")22
FLSA sets minimum wage, overtime pay, equal pay, record keeping,
and child labor standards for employees who are covered by the Act and
who are not exempt from specific provisions. Congress originally enacted
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
17. Id. § 1166.
18. Id. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 510 of ERISA prohibits an
employer from discharging an employee because the employee makes a claim for benefits
under a plan covered by title 1 of ERISA. Id. § 1140.
19. Id. § 206(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Act is part of a section of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C § 201 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20. Guidelines are promulgated by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance with
respect to the implementation and administration of Executive Order 11246. See Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
1994]
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FLSA to facilitate economic recovery from the Great Depression. FLSA
was designed to provide a maximum number of jobs and to ensure that all
covered employees were paid a minimum, liveable wage. The Act was not
intended to preempt state legislation providing additional benefits to employ-
ees.
11. Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")23
Recent Federal legislation affording protection to employees came into
effect on February 5, 1993, when President Clinton signed FMLA. The
law requires employers of fifty or more employees to provide up to twelve
weeks of leave to eligible employees for their own serious illnesses, to care
for newborn or newly adopted children, or to care for seriously ill, close
family members.24
12. Immigration Reform and Control Act25
This Act prohibits discrimination on account of national origin or
citizenship status.
13. Labor Management Relations Act 26
This Act addresses suits by and against labor organizations. Section
185(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.27
23. Pub. L. No. 103-03, § 405(b)(2), 107 Stat. 26 (1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612).
24. Id. § 102(a)(1)(A)-(D).
25. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
27. Id. § 185(a).
Vol. 19
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14. National Labor Relations Act?8
The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 and is adminis-
tered by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). This statute
prohibits discrimination based upon union membership, union activity, or
other protected concerted activity. 29 Additionally, it protects employees
from employer retaliation for filing charges or giving testimony under the
Act.30
15. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA")31
OSHA prohibits the discharge of employees in reprisal for exercising
rights under the Act.
16. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
of 1990 ("OWBPA") 3 2
The Age Discrimination and Employment Act was amended to provide
protection for older workers. OWBPA applies to all employers covered by
the ADEA and protects against age discrimination for early retirement
incentive programs and severance pay set-offs meeting OWBPA's re-
quirements. It also addresses waivers and releases, affording older workers
certain minimum criteria for their retirement or settlement of any claim.33
17. Rail Safety and Improvement Act
34
This Act prohibits railroad companies from discharging employees with
respect to certain employment conditions, including retaliation, for making
claims, testifying, or refusing to work under conditions reasonably believed
to be dangerous.
28. Id. §§ 151-169.
29. Id. § 157. Additionally, the Act prohibits employers from questioning applicants or
employees concerning their union and/or concerted activity. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988).
31. Id. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
32. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630
(1988)).
33. Id. § 201, 104 Stat. 983.
34. 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1988).
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18. Rehabilitation Act of 19733"
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federal contractors, and any
program or activity receiving financial assistance, from discriminating
against handicapped persons. Prior to the passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act was the primary civil rights act for
the disabled.
19. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196436
In a comprehensive piece of legislation, Congress passed Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This statute applies to employers with fifteen
or more employees, and prohibits discrimination in all employment
practices, including hiring, job reductions, terminations, and retaliations,
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
20. Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance
Act of 197417
The Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974
applies to all federal contractors and subcontractors, on contracts in excess
of $10,000, and prohibits discrimination in employment practices.
21. Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act ("WARN")3"
In WARN, Congress provided certain protection for employees, with
respect to plant closings and mass layoffs. It applies to employers with 100
or more employees, and requires that an employer provide sixty days ad-
vance notice, subject to certain exceptions. 39
35. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29 U.S.C §§ 701-796(f) (1988)).
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 changed sections of the Act by inserting the
provision that disability does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs. 29 U.S.C. § 706(c)(i) (Supp. H 1990).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000n (1988). Title VII is administered and enforced by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. § 2000e. Some courts have
held that a no-cause determination by the EEOC may be admitted into evidence in a trial on
the merits of the individual claim of discrimination. See Eason v. Fleming Co., 4 F.3d 989
(5th Cir. 1993).
37. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014 (1988).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
39. Id. § 2102(a)-(b).
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22. Federal Retaliation Statutes
In addition to the statutes above, there are a number of statutes dealing
specifically with individual aspects of discrimination. Primarily, these
statutes prohibit retaliation for either filing charges, testifying at proceed-
ings, or complaining about certain working conditions.4"
B. Florida Legislation
The following Florida statutes and regulations govern an employ-
er/employee relationship and affect decision making.
1. AIDS Legislation
In 1988, Florida passed a comprehensive AIDS statute4' prohibiting
employers and co-employees from harassing or discriminating against an
AIDS infected employee. Employers must allow employees with AIDS, or
any of its related conditions, to continue to work and to reasonably
40. The Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980,20 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3611 (Supp. III 1991), prohibits retaliation against employees who bring school asbestos
problems to the public's attention; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), prohibits the discharge of employees who commence, cause to commence, or testify
at proceedings against an employer for violation of the Act; the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988), prohibits the discharge of employees who assist,
participate, or testify in any proceeding to carry out the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954; the Federal Employee's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), prohibits
retaliation for providing information regarding injury or death of employees; the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
prohibits retaliation for commencing, testifying, or assisting in enforcement proceedings; the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992), prohibit retaliation for commencing, testifying, or assisting in enforcement
proceedings; the Hazardous Substances Release Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (1988), prohibits
retaliation for assisting in enforcement proceedings; the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988), prohibits retaliation for seeking workers'
compensation or for testifying in proceedings; the Migrant, Seasonal and Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), prohibits retaliation against
migrant workers who exercise their rights under the Act; and the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1988), prohibits discharge of employees because of garnishment
of wages for anyone's indebtedness. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988) (protecting against
discharge of permanent employees for serving on a federal jury); 38 U.S.C § 2021 (1988)
(protecting against discharge or discrimination based upon military service); 45 U.S.C. § 41
(1988) (protecting employees who refuse to work under conditions reasonably believed to be
unsafe).
41. FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1993).
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accommodate these employees as long as they are medically able to perform
and do not pose a danger to their own health and safety, or the health and
safety of others.
2. Florida Constitution Article 11142
Article III, paragraph 14, of the Florida Constitution authorizes the
creation of local civil service law, affording public employees rights in
employment.
3. Florida Civil Rights Act43
In 1992, Florida passed the Civil Rights Act, expanding the state's
Human Relations Act of 1977, which prohibited employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or
marital status. The Civil Rights Act expanded the types of discriminatory
practices that may be addressed by the Human Relations Act and the types
of damages that can be awarded.
4. Equal Pay Act"
4
Florida also has enacted an Equal Pay Act which is strikingly similar
to the federal statute. It differs in the time frames allowed for filing claims
for unpaid wages, and it is not applicable to any employer that is subject to
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.45
5. Florida Jury Service Exemption
Employees who are called for jury service are protected by Florida
statutes prohibiting discharge or discrimination based upon jury service.46
42. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § 14.
43. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.11 (1993).
44. Id. § 448.07. Section 725.07 of the Florida Statutes also prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex, marital status, or race in the areas of loaning money, granting credit, or
providing equal pay for equal services performed. Id. § 725.07.
45. Id. § 448.07(4).
46. Id. § 40.271. Florida also prohibits the discharge of individuals who are called to
active service in the Florida National Guard. FLA. STAT. § 250.482 (1993).
Vol. 19
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6. Public Employees Relations Act47
Public employees are protected in Florida under the Public Employees
Relations Act. The Act protects the right of organization and representation,
creates a Public Employees Relations Commission to assist in resolving
disputes, and provides remedies against public employees who interrupt the
operation and functions of the government. This policy provides:
(1) Granting to public employees the right of organization and represen-
tation;
(2) Requiring the state, local governments, and other political subdivi-
sions to negotiate with bargaining agents duly certified to represent
public employees;
(3) Creating a Public Employees Relations Commission to assist in
resolving disputes between public employees and public employers; and
(4) Recognizing the constitutional prohibition against strikes by public
employees and providing remedies for violations of such prohibition.48
7. Sickle Cell Trait Discrimination Statute'
This statute prohibits any denial or refusal to employ a person solely
because he or she has the sickle cell trait.
8. Florida Toxic Substances Legislation 0
Florida employees are also protected by statutes which prohibit
discharge, discipline, or discrimination against employees who exercise their
rights under the toxic substances law, including the requesting of informa-
tion, testifying, planning to testify, or exercising any other right.
9. Voting Discrimination
Florida prohibits employers from discharging or threatening to
discharge an employee based upon whether the individual votes or does not
vote."'
47. Id. § 447.201.
48. Id. § 447.201(l)-(4).
49. Id. § 448.075.
50. Id. § 442.116.
51. FLA. STAT. § 104.081 (1993).
19941
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10. Whistle-blower's Act52
The Florida Whistle-blower's Act prohibits employers from taking
retaliatory action against an employee who reports violations of law by
prohibiting discharge, dismissal, discipline, suspension, transfer, demotion,
withholding bonuses, and reduction in salary or benefits.
11. Florida Workers' Compensation Statute53
The Florida Workers' Compensation Statute prohibits the discharge of
or retaliation against an employee based upon a valid claim or attempt to
claim workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Statute
was significantly amended as of January 1, 1994.
III. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Historically, Florida has been known as an "at will" state. An "at will"
employee is one who is employed, literally, at the will of the employer and
who works without fixed employment. Absent a fixed contract for employ-
ment, an employee will not have an action for wrongful termination.
However, once an employer and employee do enter into an employment
contract, the issues that arise involve arbitration provisions, compensation,
breaches of contract, fraud, and the applicability and enforceability of non-
compete agreements.
A. Arbitrations
The United States Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 54 upheld an employer's right to compel arbitration of a statutory age
discrimination claim where the employee had executed a security registration
application requiring arbitration of employment related disputes. Since the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, various courts,5 5 including Florida
52. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187-.31895 (1993). The Act was amended by the Government
Efficiency Act of 1992. Subsection (3) and (4) of § 112.3187 describe the conduct which
is prohibited by the Act. In the 1991 legislative session, the Whistle Blower protection was
extended to private sector employees. See Act of June 7, 1991, 91-285, §§ 1, 4, 1991 Fla.
Laws 2747, 2748, 2749 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 448.101 (1993)).
53. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1993).
54. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
55. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a discrimination claim is subject to an arbitration agreement); Boogher v. Stifel,
Nicholaus & Co., 764 F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that an age discrimination
Vol. 19
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courts, have continued to expand the Gilmer rationale to require arbitration
of other causes of action such as Title VII and state law claims. 6
Following the ruling in Gilmer, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida issued an order requiring an employee to pursue
arbitration based upon an agreement signed by the employee with her
employer. In Nazon v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., a stockbroker with
Shearson Lehman filed a lawsuit based upon a Florida Human Rights Act
and certain state law claims. Shearson Lehman filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration relying upon an agreement the employee had signed with
Shearson Lehman entitled "Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer." The employee claimed that the arbitration was
not applicable because Florida law claims are not subject to arbitration. The
court rejected this argument and, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer, compelled arbitration. The Southern District was following the lead
of a number of state and federal courts around the country upholding
agreements that require employees to submit employment disputes to
arbitration. 8 Though most of the litigation in this area has been with stock
brokerage firms, it would be expected that employers in other industries
would start including arbitration provisions in their employment agreements.
In Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,59 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the state law claims were subject to arbitration in cases of battery, intention-
al infliction of emotional distress, and negligent retention, and that the Title
VII claim was also subject to compulsory arbitration with the plaintiffs
employer (relying on Gilmer rationales).
In Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca,60 an employee was terminated because of the results of a drug test.
The case was sent to arbitration, and the arbitrator, in response to the union
grievance, found that the employee had in fact violated his contract with the
employer by a second positive drug test. However, the arbitrator reduced
the discipline to a suspension because of the agreement's "just cause" provi-
sions, which require the company to use just and equitable procedures in
claim is subject to an arbitration clause).
56. Id. at 23. Gilmer left several issues unresolved, including whether arbitration
agreements located in documents other than security registration applications are enforceable
and whether employment claims under statutes other than the ADEA are arbitrable.
57. 832 F. Supp. 1540, 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
58. See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992);
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
59. 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
60. 996 F.2d 279, 280 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994).
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termination decisions. The arbitrator found that the company had changed
the rules of the game by requiring the second drug test."' The district
court and the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the arbitrator's finding and,
based upon the clear language of the contract, found that the employer had
the discretion to terminate an employee for a second positive drug test; thus,
the arbitrator's remedy contradicted the express language of the agree-
ment.62
At the state court level, in Bachus & Stratton, Inc. v. Mann,63 an
employee argued that her claims against the defendant alleging sexual dis-
crimination, assault and battery, breach of contract, and a number of other
tort claims, were not subject to arbitration. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal disagreed and found that both her Title VII claims and her state tort
claims were subject to arbitration.64
B. At Will
Under the common law rule, when a term of employment is for an
indefinite period of time, either party may terminate the employment
relationship for any cause, or for no cause at all, without incurring liability.
While many other jurisdictions have carved out exceptions to the "at will"
doctrine, Florida has essentially resisted any changes. For example, in Ross
v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. ,65 an employee filed an action for breach
of a written contract. The court held that the breach of contract claim was
not actionable as a matter of law because it was based on a contract of
employment that did not provide for a definite term of employment and
was, therefore, terminable at will.66
In Lozano v. Marriott Corp.,67 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida upheld the principle that a contract for employ-
ment of indefinite duration is terminable at the will of either party and as
such, an action for wrongful termination will not lie. In Lozano, an
employee alleged that his discharge was in violation of the progressive
discipline policy in the employer's handbook.68 The court rejected this
theory and dismissed the case based on applicable Florida law. It is
61. Id.
62. Id. at 281.
63. 639 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
64. Id. at 37.
65. 617 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
66. Id. at 428.
67. 844 F. Supp. 740, 742 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
68. Id.
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doubtful that these attempts to make inroads into this doctrine will meet
with much success in the near future. Yet, the theory in Lozano is not
without merit.
C. Contract Action
In Weisfeld v. Peterseil School Corp.,69 the Third District Cgurt of
Appeal reversed ajudgment entered in favor of a private school on a breach
of employment contract claim brought by a former teacher. The teacher,
Ms. Weisfeld, signed an employment contract and subsequently received an
offer to teach in the Dade County school system. She discussed the matter
with the headmaster of the private school, who, following the discussion,
called the Dade County School. As a result, the Dade County job offer was
withdrawn. The headmaster then interviewed and hired a replacement art
teacher and fired Ms. Weisfeld. Dade County filled the position it had
offered Weisfeld and, as a result, she had no job.7"
The Third District held that the headmaster, by contacting Dade
County, had acted within proper grounds to protect the school's contract.
However, once the headmaster caused Dade County to withdraw its job
offer, the school was obligated to allow Ms. Weisfeld to perform her
original contract. Thus, because the private school was estopped from
terminating Ms. Weisfeld, the school breached its contract.7'
In Warshall v. Price,72 a cardiologist, employed by a fellow doctor,
brought an action against the doctor for bonuses. The doctor counterclaimed
for conversion and civil theft of his patient list. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that the doctor was denied the benefit of this confidential
patient list when the cardiologist took a copy from the doctor's computer
and thus, an action for conversion was appropriate.73
D. Fraud
Florida's Second District Court, in Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States,74 was faced with the issue of whether an em-
69. 623 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 1993).
70. Id. at 516.
71. Id. at 517.
72. 629 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
73. Id. at 905. The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that there was no applicable
Florida case law and relied upon the case of Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757 (II. App. Ct.
1987). Id. at 905 n.4.
74. 622 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1993).
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ployee can allege fraud when there is a merger clause in an employment
contract. An insurance agent brought suit against an insurance company and
its regional manager, claiming they fraudulently induced him into resigning
from his employment as a public school teacher to become an insurance
agent. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant because
it found a merger clause in the employment contract. The court reasoned
that the employee could not justifiably rely on any promises because of the
merger agreement.75
The Second District reversed and remanded, finding that allegations of
fraud may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud, notwithstanding the
presence of a merger clause in a related contract. The court found that the
case of Nobles v. Citizens Mortgage Corp.76 was the controlling authority
and that the trial court had improperly applied the case of Saunders Leasing
System, Inc. v. Gulf Central Distribution Center, Inc.77
E. Non-Compete Agreements
One of the main issues relating to contracts between an employer and
an employee that is litigated extensively in Florida is non-compete agree-
ments. In 1953, Florida enacted section 542.33 of the Florida Statutes,
which basically prohibits an employee from engaging in a similar business
or soliciting his or her own customers if the employment contract contains
a specific non-compete clause.78 In 1990, the Florida Legislature amended
the statute, requiring evidence of irreparable injury and made available a
defense of unreasonableness in a general sense, rather than the heretofore
limited defenses of unreasonableness as to time and area.79
75. Id. at 28.
76. 479 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In Nobles, the court applied the rule
that alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud
notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract. Id. at 822.
77. 513 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 584
(1988).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1993). Common law contracts and restraint of trade
(including non-competes) were not favored and Florida, in derogation of the common law,
enacted § 542.33, entitled "Contracts in restraint of trade valid." Id. § 542.33(2)(a) (effective
June 28, 1990). The 1990 amendment made a substantial change in the law by requiring
evidence of irreparable injury. Id.
79. Id. § 542.33. For a discussion of the statute concerning non-compete agreements,
see Kendall B. Coffey, Non compete Agreements by the Former Employee: A Florida Law
Survey and Analysis, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 727 (1980). For discussion of the 1990 statutory
amendment, see Kendall B. Coffey & Thomas F. Nealon III, Non compete Agreements Under
Florida Law: A Retrospective and a Requiem?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1105 (1992).
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the new amendment in
Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic, P.A. v. White."0 Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic ap-
pealed a final declaratory judgment that held that a covenant not to compete
executed by one of its physician's shareholders is unenforceable. The trial
court apparently grounded its decision whether Dr. White's opening a
competing practice would be unfair."'
The Fifth District reversed and held that the controlling question was
not whether allowing the competing practice would be unfair, but rather,
how the provisions of section 542.33 applied. The court stated that the
amended statute did not prohibit all agreements restricting subsequent
employment by physicians, and that the clinic had necessary legitimate
business interests to be protected by enforcement of the covenant. The court
reversed the trial court's finding, and remanded the case.
8 2
In analyzing the 1990 amendment, the Jewett court found that an
employer would have to offer evidence of actual harm not readily,
accurately calculated or compensated by money damages. The employer
would also have to establish that the covenant he or she seeks to enforce
does not threaten the health, safety, or welfare of the public, and under all
relevant circumstances is reasonable.
In Coastal Computer Corp. v. Team Management Systems, Inc.,83 the
court held that an employment agreement providing that a violation of a
non-compete clause could result in forfeiture of remaining settlement
benefits. This, however, was not an exclusive remedy. In the absence of
an exclusive, stipulated remedy set forth in the agreement, the court found
a party may elect to pursue any remedy that the law affords, which includes
enjoining the enforcement of a non-compete agreement.8 4
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
In addition to responsibilities and resulting liabilities to its own
employees, an employer may also face liability to third parties as a result of
an employee's actions or inactions. In order to find a deep pocket in terms
of contract or tort actions, many attorneys file claims not only against an
employee, but also against the employer. An employer may face claims by
80. 629 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 924.
82. Id. at 925.
83. 624 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
84. Id.
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both employees and third parties with respect to negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision.
A. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
An employer may face liability for injuries or damages to a third party
as a result of the actions of an employee. Plaintiffs may bring claims of
negligence for the hiring, retention, and supervision of an employee. Both
employees and third parties are asserting negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claims in an attempt to hold employers liable for the assaults
and sexual harassment by employees in the work place (i.e. finding the deep
pocket).
In Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 5 the Florida
Supreme Court recognized that a female plaintiff, who alleged repeated
touching and verbal sexual advances by her supervisor, had stated a viable
case for liability in negligent supervision, hiring, or retention.
In Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc.,86 the theory was that the employer
knew of the particular employee's propensity to engage in conduct that
could endanger co-employees and yet failed to address this conduct. The
court recognized the basic rule that an employer is liable for the willful torts
of his employee committed against third persons if the employer knew or
should have known that the employee was a threat to others. 7
Likewise, in Nuta v. Genders,"8 the plaintiff sued a boatyard owner for
injuries he received when a security guard struck him in the head with an
iron bar. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury's finding of negligent hiring or retaining of the security guard. The
evidence apparently showed that the security guard had threatened the
plaintiff two months earlier and had been investigated for his involvement
in another earlier assault. It is clear in this case that there was sufficient
evidence indicating that the employer knew of the employee's prior conduct
or propensity to engage in certain actions, and the employer could therefore
be held liable. 9
In Spancrete, Inc. v. Ronald E. Frazier & Associates, P.A.,90 a
subcontractor on a community college construction project brought an action
85. 552 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 1989).
86. 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1374
(1981).
87. Id. at 1239-40.
88. 617 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
89. Id. at 331.
90. 630 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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against a consultant architect for injuries incurred as a result of negligent
supervision. The court found that a supervising architect has no liability to
a subcontractor and that a duty of care is only owed by a supervising
architect to a general contractor.9
The Fifth District, in Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Harris,92 considered
a claim that Winn Dixie was negligent in instructing one of its employees
on how to deal with a suspected trespasser. Winn Dixie had a policy of
hiring only trained police officers and the court found that it could not "be
faulted for assuming such an officer would know how to detain trespass-
ers."93 The court also noted that there was no evidence in the case of any
prior misconduct by his officer. The court said that the test is one of
reasonableness, and it is simply unreasonable, as a matter of law, to require
Winn-Dixie to retrain already trained police officers in the law of arrest and
detention.
This author expects that employers will see more and more cases
dealing with negligent hiring, retention, and supervision as attorneys are
looking more and more for the deep pocket.
B. Liability to Employees of Independent Contractors
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in St. Lucie Harvesting &
Caretaking Corp. v. Cervantes,94 considered the issue of whether or not a
grove owner was liable to the employee of an independent contractor hired
to harvest the grove owner's fruit. The employee was injured while
allegedly using his employer's defective equipment. The plaintiff charged
that the grove owners, in exercising direction and control over the manner
in which they performed their job, were negligent, thus causing the injuries.
The court noted, as a general rule, that a person who hires an indepen-
dent contractor is not liable for injuries sustained by employees of the
independent contractor. The court cited an exception, however, in Conklin
v. Cohen,9" which held that if an "owner actively participates 'to the extent
that he directly influences the manner in which the work is performed' and
negligently creates or allows a dangerous condition to exist resulting in
injury to the employee of the independent contractor[,]" the employer may
91. Id. at 1198.
92. 620 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
93. Id. at 1032.
94. 639 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
95. 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973).
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be liable. 6  In this particular case, the Fourth District did not find the
employers within the Conklin exception.
C. Punitive Damages
Employers constantly fear vicarious liability for an employee's
outrageous conduct since a jury could award punitive damages for that
employee's actions. In one of the more interesting and noteworthy decisions
of the last year, the Fourth District in CarrollAir Systems, Inc. v. Greenbau-
m9 7 affirmed a judgment against an employer for $85,000 in compensatory
damages and $800,000 in punitive damages for the wrongful death of the
plaintiff's son, caused by the drunk driving of a Carroll Air employee.98
The court found it significant that the employee became drunk while on the
job. He was at a meeting, where he paid for the drinks from an expense
account. There was evidence that the employee was slurring his words
while company officers were present.
The court noted there were cogent policy reasons for fixing liability on
the employer for injuries to third persons in cases like CarrollAir and noted
that "[t]he law now recognizes that the entire subject of torts is a reflection
of social policies which fix financial responsibility for harm done."99 The
Carroll court further noted that "the underlying philosophy which allows a
plaintiff to hold an employer liable for an employee's negligent acts is a
deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise should not be able to
disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be the
result of its activity."' °
In Crown Eurocars, Inc. v. Schropp,'' a customer who was dissatis-
fied with his new automobile brought an action in fraud against the automo-
bile dealer and the dealer's employee. The Second District held that there
96. St. Lucie, 639 So. 2d at 39 (quoting Conklin, 287 So. 2d at 60).
97. 629 So. 2d 914, 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court in CarrollAir noted
that "[c]ourts across the country are divided on the issue of whether an employer is liable for
injuries to third parties under similar circumstances." Id. at 916.
98. Id. at 917.
99. Id. at 916 (quoting Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (Ct. App.
1981)).
100. Id. at 916-17.
101. 636 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court in Crown Eurocars
analyzed the case under Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson, 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985)
(discussing managing agent) and Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545
(Fla. 1981), and concluded that under any analysis there were no grounds for punitive
damages against the employer. Crown Eurocars, 636 So. 2d at 35.
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was sufficient evidence to support a compensatory damage award on the
fraud claim, but the dealer could not be held liable for punitive damages.
The court found the exoneration of the employee from an award of punitive
damages precluded the assessment of punitive damages against the employer
absent any evidence that the employer itself behaved outrageously." 2
V. FEDERAL STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND CASE LAW
Federal statutes, regulations, and case law have a major impact on
employer/employee relations in Florida. Cases decided by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals for states other than Florida, and decisions of the
United States Supreme Court may have as much impact on employ-
er/employee relations as a decision by either a Florida state or federal court.
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA ")
In one of the more recent significant decisions, the United States
Supreme Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins °3 addressed the issue of
the standard of proof in a disparate treatment case. In Hazen, the plaintiff
was fired a few weeks before reaching the ten-year vesting level in a
pension plan. The Court first reviewed conflicting lower court cases
concerning whether firing someone to avoid a pension, to save salary costs,
or because of seniority, violates the ADEA. The Court then stated:
We now clarify that there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA
when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the
employee's age ... [w]hatever the employer's decision making process,
a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's
protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determi-
native influence on the outcome .... It is the very essence of age
discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer
believes that productivity and competence decline with old age.0 4
102. Id. at 36.
103. 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1703 (1993). In Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d
1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994), the court adopted the reasoning of Hazen and found that
discharging an employee solely to reduce salary cost is not age discrimination under the
ADEA.
104. Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1705-06. The Court noted that it did not mean to
suggest that an employer could lawfully fire an employee in order to prevent his pension
benefits from vesting. This would be a violation under § 510 of ERISA. Id. at 1707.
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In Hazen, the Court also reemphasized the distinction between willful
and non-willful violations of the ADEA. In order to show willfulness, there
is no requirement that the conduct be outrageous. The Court stated that an
employer would not be liable for liquidated damages if it incorrectly, but in
good faith, believed that its age-based decision was permitted by the ADEA.
The Eleventh Circuit in Sturniolo v. Sheaffer, Eaton, Inc."5 addressed
the issue of whether a complaint under the ADEA was barred as being
untimely. The employee was told, at the time of the discharge, that his
position was being eliminated to obtain financial savings. He later learned
that it was a discharge and he was replaced by a younger person. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the time period for filing an age discrimination
charge with the EEOC was tolled until the terminated individual learned or
should have learned of the fact that he was being replaced by a younger
person. 6 Mere suspicion of age discrimination is not sufficient to start
the running of the statute.
In Perkie v. Group Technologies, Inc., ' 7 Judge Kovachevich of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, discussed the
various burdens of proof required in a reduction of force case where the
plaintiffs allege age and sex discrimination. The defendant in Perkie
claimed that the ADEA did not allow for punitive damages. Judge
Kovachevich noted that the Eleventh Circuit, as well as a number of other
jurisdictions, allows plaintiffs to claim appropriate punitive damages under
the ADEA.'08
One interesting state court case also addressed issues under the ADEA.
In Bolves v. Hullinger,'0 9 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ad-
dressed a malpractice claim alleging that the plaintiff's former attorneys
negligently failed to timely file a federal age discrimination suit against the
plaintiffs former employer. The court looked at the merits of the ADEA
claim to determine whether or not there was any malpractice. The jury had
found that there was negligence in failing to timely file the ADEA claim,
but the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed."0
The employee's evidence showed that the violation was willful.
However, it also showed that the decision to fire him was made quickly, and
105. 15 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. at 1026.
107. 845 F. Supp. 852, 856-58 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
108. Id. at 858; see also Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., L.P., 940 F.2d 1429 (11th
Cir. 1991).
109. 629 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
110. Id. at 200.
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one of the employers admitted that the procedures in the personnel manual
for termination were not followed. Additionally, the personnel office was
not contacted and neither of the employee's supervisors ever considered the
ADEA when terminating the employee. The court noted the fact that the
supervisor made a pure business decision, necessitated by corporate organi-
zation, was never rebutted. Citing federal case law, the Fifth District Court
found that "[r]eorganization of a business and the elimination of an older
employee based on the employee's poor performance relative to younger
peers is a nondiscriminatory basis for discharge. . . ."'" In this case, the
court found that any alleged negligence in allowing the statute of limitations
to expire in the federal claim did not result in damage to Hullinger."2
In Maleszewski v. United States,"3 a taxpayer sued the United States
seeking a refund of income taxes paid on money received in settlement of
an employment discrimination lawsuit. The district court held that the
settlement was not damages received on account of-personal injuries and,
under the Internal Revenue Code, it was not excluded from gross income.
The ADEA does not redress tort-like personal injuries for purposes of
exclusion. Judge Vinson, the United States district judge, noted in his
decision that the result was contrary to that reached by three circuit courts
of appeals." 4
B. Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA ')"5
The ADA is an attempt to impose an all-inclusive ban on discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals in every sector of society, including:
employment, public services, public accommodations, and services operated
by private entities. Title I of the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992
for employers of twenty-five or more employees and was amended on July
26, 1994 to bring employers with fifteen to twenty-four employees within
its purview." 6 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC-
") has enacted regulations interpreting the ADA." 7
111. Id. at 201.
112. Id.
113. 827 F. Supp. 1553, 1554 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
114. Id. at 1557. See, e.g., Rickel v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 900 F.2d 655 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that ADEA action is excusable under § 104(b)(2)); Pistillo v. Comm'r
of Internal Revenue, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940
F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
116. Id. § 12111(5).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-.16 (1993).
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The EEOC recently issued an informative guide to the field of pre-
employment disability related inquiries and medical examinations under the
ADA."' The guide lists common acceptable and unacceptable pre-offer
inquiries and examinations." 9
In one of the more interesting decisions affecting disabled individuals,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether obesity is
a disability. In Cook v. State of Rhode Island Department of Mental Health,
Retardation and Hospitals,' the court held that discrimination based on
an employer's determination that the job applicant is morbidly obese violates
the Rehabilitation Act. The court endorsed the view stated by the EEOC in
its amicus brief that obesity qualifies as a disability if it constitutes an
impairment, and if it is of such a duration that it substantially limits a life
activity, or is regard as so limiting. The EEOC's interpretive guidelines on
the ADA state that excess weight may be classified as an impairment if it
either falls outside the normal raqge (for example, morbid obesity) or falls
within a normal range, but is a pioduct of a physiological disorder. Thus,
obesity could be a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
118. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act, No. 187 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) N: 2321 (May 19, 1994)
[hereinafter EEOC Compliance Manual].
119. The following examples are inquiries which are not disability-related:
1. Can you perform the functions of this job (essential and/or marginal), with
or without reasonable accommodation?
2. Please describe/demonstrate how you would perform these functions
(essential and/or marginal).
3. Do you have a cold? Have you ever tried Tylenol for fever? How did
you break your leg?
4. Can you meet the attendance requirements of this job? How many days
did you take leave last year?
5. Do you illegally use drugs? Have you used illegal drugs in the last two
years?
6. Do you have the required licenses to perform this job?
7. How much do you weigh? How tall are you? Do you regularly eat three
meals per day?
The following examples are disability-related inquiries:
1. Do you have AIDS? Do you have asthma?
2. Do you have a disability which would interfere with your ability to
perform the job?
3. How many days were you sick last year?
4. Have you ever filed for workers' compensation?
5. Have you ever been injured on the job?
See id.
120. 10 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1993).
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In Kelsey v. University Club of Orlando, Inc.,' Judge G. Kendall
Sharp reversed a summary judgment for the plaintiff. A Florida man was
fired from his job as a barber for the University Club of Orlando. Judge
Sharp determined that he could not recover under the ADA because the
University Club is a bona fide private club and thus exempt from the Act.
The judge noted that the Orlando club did not allow guests unfettered use
of its facilities, nor did the Orlando Club advertise its facilities to non-
members or allow members to hold private parties during regular club hours.
Judge Sharp noted that given the limited guest policy, the Orlando club is
a private club.122
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991123
In 1991, Congress passed a compromise version of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Section 3 of the Act outlines the purposes of the new Act,
including the following:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the work place;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related"
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio;
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines
for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expand-
ing the scope of relevant civil right statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination.'24
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, an employer could avoid
liability for intentional discrimination if he or she established that he or she
would have made the same decision without taking gender into account.
However, the Act reversed the Supreme Court's holding in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins'25 and now, once the complaining party demonstrates
121. 845 F. Supp. 1526, 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
122. Id. at 1529-30.
123. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
124. Id. § 3, at 1071 (citations omitted).
125. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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that sex was a motivating factor, the employer will lose even though he or
she would have taken the same action without considering the unlawful
factor.
Section 105 of the Act also rejected the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.126 Under section 105(a)(i)-(ii), a
plaintiff can now establish disparate impact if:
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes a demonstration... [of an alter-
native employment practice] and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.127
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also rejects the Supreme Court's holding
in EEOC v. Arabian-American Oil Co., 21 which held that Title VII does
not apply to United States citizens employed by the United States outside
the United States. Section 109 of the Act, however, specifically provides
that, "[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes
an individual who is a citizen of the United States."'
129
In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,3' the United
States Supreme Court considered the inclusion of expert fees within the
definition of "reasonable attorney's fees" as contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Court held that fees for services rendered by experts in civil rights
litigation may not be shifted to the losing party as part of a "reasonable
attorney's fees" under § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, section 118 specifically modifies
section 1988 to include expert fees within the definition of attorney's fees
in civil rights litigation.'
Possibly the most important change brought by the Civil Rights Act of
1991 is an individual's right to punitive and compensatory damages in cases
of sex, religion, or disability discrimination. Section 102 of the new Act
126. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071; see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
127. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a)(i)-(ii), 105 Stat. at 1071 (1991).
128. 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991).
129. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077.
130. 499 U.S. 83, 85 (1991).
131. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 103, 105 Stat. at 1077.
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entitled "Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimination in Employment"
specifically allows compensatory and punitive damages to victims of sex,
religion, and disability discrimination under Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and section 501 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Previously,
compensatory and punitive damages were available only to victims of race,
national origin, or ethnic discrimination within the parameters of § 1981.
Additionally, the Act places certain limits upon the total amount of
compensatory and punitive damages. Compensatory and punitive damages
are allowed only in cases of intentional discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. In addition, the Act places certain limits upon the total
amount of compensatory and punitive damages an individual may recover.
The limitation includes a $50,000 ceiling for employers of 100 or fewer
employees; a ceiling of $100,000 for employers of more than 100 but fewer
than 201 employees; a ceiling of $200,000 for employers of more than 200
but fewer than 501 employees; and a ceiling of $300,000 for employers of
more than 500 employees. These caps, however, do not apply to claims of
race discrimination. In addition, the Act explicitly states that courts will be
unable to inform juries of the monetary limitations during their deliberations
on punitive and compensatory damages. 32
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,'33 and Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., ' the United States Supreme Court ruled that sections 101 and 102
of the Act do not apply retroactively to cases based on conduct occurring
before enactment on November 21, 1991. The Court noted that where
Congress fails to clearly indicate whether the key provisions of the Act
should be retroactive, fundamental concerns about fairness and notice to
defendants dictate prospective application only.
Section 102 provides for jury trial, and compensatory and punitive
damages for claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In Landgraf, the Court held that provisions for punitive damages are not
retroactive because such damages have features that are similar to criminal
statutes and, therefore, raise serious constitutional questions about applying
the law retroactively.'35 Similarly, the Court found that compensatory
damages should not be retroactively applied because they increase liability
for past conduct and affect employers' planning. The jury trial provision,
alone, might have been retroactively applied, but since it was enacted in
132. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 1071.
133. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
134. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
135. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1497.
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conjunction with the new damages provisions, the Court found that it should
be applied prospectively as well.'36
In Rivers, the Court also held that section 101 of the Act does not
apply to cases based on conduct that occurred prior to enactment.
137
Section 101 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to permit plaintiffs to sue for
discrimination occurring during all phases of the employment relationship,
including termination. This section was added specifically to reverse the
1989 United States Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union.138 The Court rejected the argument that section 101 of the Act
merely restored a long-accepted interpretation of § 1981 and, therefore, was
intended to be retroactive.1 3
9
D. The Equal Pay Act ("EPA ')14'
The EPA prohibits the payment of different wages to employees of
opposite sexes when they perform equal work or hold jobs whose perfor-
mance requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are
performed under similar working conditions.
In Meeks v. Computer Associates International,14' the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a claim brought under the EPA for
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The jury found that the
defendant had violated the EPA and the district court held that it was bound
by that jury finding. The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that the jury's
finding of the EPA liability did not support a finding of Title VII discrimi-
nation liability absent the additional finding of intentional discrimina-
tion. 142
E. Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA ")
Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales 43 is a case which addressed whether
a salesperson's termination was actionable under ERISA in the Eleventh
Circuit. In Seaman, the court held that a real estate company violated
section 510 of ERISA when it terminated a salesperson in order to eliminate
136. Id. at 1483.
137. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519-20.
138. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
139. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1521-22.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1990).
141. 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 1019.
143. 985 F.2d 543 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 308 (1993).
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the cost of certain plan benefits, despite the fact that such benefits were not
yet vested under the plan.1 44 In this case, Patricia Seaman was entitled to
health insurance coverage and to participate in a 401(k) plan under her
employment contract. She was offered a new contract which did not
provide for such benefits. When she refused the offer, she was terminated.
At the time of her discharge, her rights in the plan benefits had not vested.
She alleged in her suit that the employer had violated section 510 of ERISA
because she was terminated in order to eliminate the costs of providing
health insurance coverage and contributions under the 401(k) plan. 45
The district court dismissed the suit, but the Eleventh Circuit found that
the employer had violated section 510 of ERISA and that its determination
did not depend on whether or not the benefits were vested or contingent.
Instead, the court noted that the proper inquiry is the purpose of the
discharge. 146
F. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA )147
FMLA became effective on August 5, 1993, and covers private or
public employers who employ fifty or more employees within a seventy-five
mile radius of the employer's facility. The Act requires covered employers
to provide eligible employees with an unpaid leave of up to twelve weeks
in any twelve month period for a number of circumstances. These include
birth, adoption, foster care of a child, care of a spouse, son, daughter or
parent of the employee with a serious health condition, and a serious health
condition of the employee which prevents the employee from performing the
functions of his or her position. Upon return from leave, an employee is
entitled to reinstatement to his or her previous position or a position with the
equivalent pay and benefits. The Act also works in conjunction with
existing federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination.1
48
One of the interesting issues raised by FMLA is its interrelationship
with the ADA. There are certain differences between the two statutes,
including who is a covered employer and employee. An employee may be
144. Id. at 544.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1990). On February 5, 1993, President Clinton signed the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. The ADA applies to all private employees with 15
or more employees, while the FMLA applies to employers with 50 or more employees within
a 75 mile radius of the work site. Florida's workers' compensation law, with limited excep-
tions, applies to all public and private employees. See FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01-.60 (1993).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1990).
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covered by the ADA, but not by the FMLA. The Department of Labor is
responsible for interpreting and enforcing FMLA, and is in the process of
issuing regulations.
G. Procedural Issues
In Griffin v. Singletaiy,4 9 the court addressed the issue of the timely
filing of charges of discrimination with the EEOC and held that individuals
who had not filed timely charges of discrimination with the EEOC were not
entitled to intervene as class representatives in a Title VII action.
H. Rehabilitation Act
50
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that a qualified
handicapped employee cannot be excluded from derived benefits under any
program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. The Eleventh
Circuit in Jackson v. Veteran's Administration' held that to prove
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act,5 2 the plaintiff must show that
he or she: 1) is handicapped within the meaning of the Act and relevant
regulations; 2) is otherwise qualified for the position in question; 3) worked
for a program or activity that received federal financial assistance; and 4)
was treated adversely solely because of his or her handicap.' 3 In Jackson,
the plaintiff claimed he had a disability caused by rheumatoid arthritis. The
VA hospital fired him for excessive absences. The court held that he was
not otherwise qualified because he failed to satisfy the presence requirement
of the job, and the VA did not have a duty to accommodate his unpre-
dictable absences. 1
54
In Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc.,'5s the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, when requested, a jury trial is constitutionally
required under the Act." 6
149. 17 F.3d 356, 359-61 (11th Cir. 1994).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
151. 22 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1994).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
153. Jackson, 22 F.3d at 278.
154. Id.
155. 24 F.3d 152 (11 th Cir. 1994).
156. Id. at 156.
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I. Title VII--Sexual Harassment
In one of the more significant decisions in the last year, the United
States Supreme Court spoke for only the second time in ten years on the
issue of sexual harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.'57 In this
case, Teresa Harris, a female employee claimed that the president of the
company insulted her because of her gender and made her the target of
unwanted sexual innuendos. When she complained of his behavior, he
expressed surprise and apologized. Within a month after she had closed a
major deal with a customer, the president asked her, in front of her co-
workers, whether or not she had promised sex to close the deal. Ms. Harris
quit her employment that next day.
5 1
The Supreme Court held that federal law with regard to sexual
harassment does not require the establishment of any psychological
harm. "'59 The Court further stated that there was no single factor that
makes a working environment hostile or abusive, rather the nature of the
environment must be determined by looking at all of the circumstances,
including such things as the frequency of discriminatory conduct, the
severity of the conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perfor-
mance.
60
The decision produced a broader standard for liability than in, the past
and should make it more difficult for employers to win at trial. However,
the Harris decision left many questions unanswered, including whether the
objective standard in hostile environment cases should be the reasonable
person, the reasonable victim, or the reasonable woman standard. The Court
used the reasonable person terminology.' 6' It is not clear what the lower
courts will do with this issue, given the Court's failure to address the
question specifically. The Court also fails to specifically address if or how
compensatory damages can be awarded and measured in the absence of
proof of psychological injury.
157. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
158. Id. at 369.
159. Id. at 371.
160. Id. at 370-71.
161. Id. at 371.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has published a guide
with respect to its interpretation and implementation of the Harris deci-
sion. 6 2 The enforcement guide sent out to its field staff analyzes Harris
and its effect on the Commission's investigations of charges involving
harassment.
The EEOC has taken the position that Harris reaffirmed Meritor v. Vin-
cent"'63 and clarified, rather than altered, the elements necessary for
proving hostile environment sexual harassment. The EEOC also noted that
the Court's rejection of the psychological injury requirement was consistent
with the Commission's policy. The EEOC stressed that the Court did not
elaborate on the definition of a reasonable person in Harris, but advised
investigators that they should continue to consider whether a reasonable
person in the victim's circumstances would have found the alleged behavior
to be hostile or abusive.'64
In a pre-Harris decision, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida addressed issues involving a workplace ro-
mance. In Ayers v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 the manager
of a retail store brought a claim under the Civil Rights Act and ADEA
alleging that her supervisor transferred her to a less lucrative store and
transferred his paramour to a more desirable store. Gladys Ayers claimed
the romantic relationship between her supervisor and her replacement was
in violation of Title VII and the ADEA.
The district court held that the hiring of the supervisor's lover did not
violate Title VII. Any coercion used in placing the manager in a more
desirable store where the supervisor and that manager resumed a sexual
relationship did not violate Title VII.' 66 The court noted the EEOC's
policy that Title VII does not prohibit preferential treatment based upon
consensual romantic relationships.'67
162. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE No. 915002.
163. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
165. 826 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
166. Id. at 447.
167. Id. at 443.
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J. Title VII-Civil Rights Act of 1964
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,'68 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a trier of fact must find for the
plaintiff when it only rejects employer's asserted reasons for discriminatory
actions. The Supreme Court overturned the Eighth Circuit's decision and
found specifically that the "trier of fact's rejection of [an] employer's
asserted, legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions does not
entitle [an] employee to judgment as [a] matter of law under McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green .... ",I69
The court reviewed its holdings on burden of proof set forth in
McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine.7 and noted that the ultimate question is whether the plaintiff
proved that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
because of race. The Court noted that the fact finder's disbelief of the
defendant's justification together with the elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination, would be sufficient to show intentional discrimination.
However, while mere rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons may
allow the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination, it does not compel
judgment for the plaintiff.''
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
decided Roberts v. University of South Florida.' The trial judge deter-
168. 113 S. Ct 2742 (1993). In Newton v. CBS, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1994),
the court denied a defendant's summary judgment motion in an ADEA termination case on
the grounds that material facts remained in dispute as to whether the defendant's proffered
explanation was protection. The plaintiff raised questions about the level of her qualifications
compared to other employees and about an ambiguous comment made at the time of
termination which could have been construed to be direct evidence of age animus. In
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that false evidence of the employer's only proffered explanation
automatically raised a material issue of fact as to discriminatory intent, thus precluding
summary judgment and requiring a trial. Id.
169. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2742-43 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1993)). Here, the Court established an allocation of the burden of production in
Title VII discriminatory treatment cases. The employee makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination and the employer articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
challenged action. The plaintiff then tries to discredit that reason and establish that the
reason is protection. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792.
170. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
171. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
172. 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,778 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 1993).
1994]
35
Hyland: Labor and Employment Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
mined that in 1988 the University of South Florida improperly paid a female
employee less money than a black male employee. The court considered the
remedies available under Title VII, and noted it was inclined to direct that
the plaintiff be granted tenure at the university relying on opinions from the
Third Circuit 173 and the Sixth Circuit. 74  However, the trial court de-
clined to grant tenure, indicating an opportunity remained for the plaintiff
to be awarded tenure by the university. At the time of the lawsuit, she had
not yet been denied tenure. 17
5
In Patricia Thompson v. Haskell Co., 176 the District Court held that
a supervisor could not be sued individually under Title VII for alleged sex
discrimination. The court noted that the relief granted under Title VII is
against the employer, not individual employees who violate the Act.
In Watson v. Bally Manufacturing Corp.,77 a number of employees
brought an action against an employer under Title VII, as well as state tort
law. The employer argued that the allegations of improper transfer and
verbal harassment occurred more than 300 days prior to the administrative
filing of the charge, and were therefore barred. The court noted that an
allegedly improper transfer from Ohio to Florida is not the type of act that
would appear to alert an employee to his duty to assert his rights and thus,
a motion to dismiss was denied.
In Griffin v. Singletary,'78 the court held that the pending Title VII
class action tolled the need for class members to file an administrative
charge, when class certification is vacated because the representative failed
to timely file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.7
However, the court further noted that the period is tolled for those class
members wishing to bring individual suits, but is not tolled for members
wishing to bring class action suits.
In Williams v. City of Montgomery,8 ' the court faced a number of
issues including whether or not the city of Montgomery and the Mont-
gomery City/County Personnel Board were employers for purposes of Title
VII. The evidence in the case demonstrated that the Board exercised certain
duties traditionally reserved to an employer, such as establishing a pay plan,
173. See Kunda v. Mullenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
174. See Gutzwuller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988).
175. Roberts, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,778.
176. 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,080 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 1994).
177. 844 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
178. 17 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994).
179. Id. at 360.
180. 742 F.2d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1984).
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formulating minimum standards for jobs, evaluating employees, and
transferring, promoting, or demoting employees. The Eleventh Circuit
found that because of these actions, the Board was an agent of the city for
purposes of Title VII.
Though the case of NAACP v. Seibels"' does not significantly impact
more routine labor and employment issues, the court addressed litigation
which began more than twenty years ago when the United States and private
parties filed civil rights complaints against the city of Birmingham, the
personnel board of Jefferson County, and other local governmental agencies
and officials. The decision provides a fairly extensive discussion of
affirmative action programs and promotion goals.'
VI. SUMMARY OF FLORIDA REGULATIONS, STATUTES,
AND CASE LAW
The following is a summary of a broad range of issues under Florida
law involving employers and employees.
A. AIDS
Florida Statutes prohibit discrimination by an employer on the basis of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome-related complex, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV)). 183  In "X" Corp. v. "Y" Person,84 X Corporation filed an
action for declaratory relief against one of its employees alleging that it was
in doubt as to its rights, duties, and responsibilities concerning the AIDS
statute. X Corporation alleged that Y Person informed several employees
that he had tested HIV-positive and had AIDS. The complaint further
alleged that X Corporation asked Y to voluntarily transfer to another
position without a loss of pay or benefits, in order to reduce the risk of
transmission of HIV. Y refused.
181. 20 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548
(1lth Cir. 1994).
182. For a history of related cases see In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1987), afd in part, rev'd in part, 20 F.3d
1525 (1 1th Cir. 1994); NAACP v. Seibels, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,504 (N.D. Ala.
1977), a.ffd in part, rev'd in part, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Birmingham Reverse
Discrimination Litig., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,022 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
183. FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1993).
184. 622 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The employer argued that a failure to transfer could create a significant
risk because of exposure to situations involving lacerations or cuts. The
court determined that a declaratory judgment would resolve the apparently
conflicting duties of X Corporation to Y under the statute, and X's duty to
other employees to provide a safe working environment given a known
risk. ' 5
B. Attorney's Fees
In Department of Education v. Rushton,'86 the First District Court of
Appeal refused to allow an attorney's fee award granted by the Florida
Commission on Human Relations for representation in a collateral proceed-
ing. The attorney represented the Florida Education Association, United and
Florida Teaching Professors/National Education Association in an action
pursuant to section 120.56 of the Florida Statutes, challenging teachers
unions. The Florida Commission on Human Relations awarded the
attorney's fees pursuant to section 760.10(13) of the Florida Statutes. The
Department of Education challenged the fee award. The court reversed the
award and directed that, since the attorneys did not represent the individual
appellees in the rule challenge, the Florida Commission on Human Relations
was to exclude from the full award, all amounts associated with the attorn-
ey's representation of the union and the separate rule challenging proceed-
ing. 1 7
C. Collective Bargaining
In City of Delray Beach v. Professional Firefighters of Delray
Beach,'88 the City of Delray Beach Public Employees Relations Commit-
tee held that the city violated its employees' rights when it failed to continue
paying individual increases during the status quo period. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal, noting it was a case of first impression, affirmed
the final order entered by the Committee and held that the employees had
a reasonable expectation that they would continue to receive individual
performance increases during the period between collective bargaining
185. Id. at 1101-02.
186. 638 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). In Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 1023 (1994), the Supreme Court considered a claim for attorney's fees under the
Copyright Act. The Court reviewed its decision in Christianberg Garment, Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978), which construed attorney's fees language under Title VII.
187. Rushton, 638 So. 2d at 100.
188. 636 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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agreements. The city knew or should have known that it was violating well-
established law when it stopped paying individual performance raises.8 9
In Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida,90 the Florida Supreme Court
held that the legislature's unilateral modification and abrogation of a funded
collective bargaining agreement violated the right to collectively bargain and
constituted an impermissible impairment of contract. The Florida Legisla-
ture can reduce previously approved appropriations if it demonstrates a
compelling state interest.' 9'
D. Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
Initially, Florida enacted the Human Rights Act of 1977.92 This
was modeled after Title VII with additional prohibitions against age, handi-
cap, and marital status discrimination. In 1992, the Florida Legislature
amended section 760.01 to rename the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977,
the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). FCRA generally authorizes
a recovery of damages by complainants in certain cases, preserves the right
to a jury trial on issues involving damages, enlarges the time for filing a
charge, modifies procedures for the prosecution of claims, and extends the
subpoena power of the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The 1992
amendments enlarge the time within which a complaint or charge of
discrimination must be filed under FCRA from 180 to 365 days from the
time of the alleged violation.' The Act also provides for unlawful
discrimination in the areas of education, employment, housing or public
accommodation. The Florida Civil Rights Act also added two additional
189. Id. at 163.
190. 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
191. Id. at 673.
192. FLA. STAT. § 760.01 (1992). Section 13 of the FCRA originally provided that the
amendment would apply to conduct occurring after October 1, 1992, while § 14 provided that
the Act would take effect on July 1, 1992. Section 14 was amended by § 4 of chapter 92-
282 to provide that the effective date of the Act shall be October 1, 1992.
193. FLA. STAT. § 760.11(1) (1992). Shorter time periods have also been provided for
the investigation and handling of charges. The Florida Commission on Human Relations has
180 days to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice
has occurred. In cases where a reasonable cause determination has been issued, a civil action
in court must be brought no later than one year after the date of the reasonable cause
determination. Id. § 760.11(3).
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exemptions. One relating to an anti-nepotism policy 94 and another
relating to religious corporations.'95
One of the most important modifications brought to FCRA is an
expansion of the type and scope of damages available. The new Act
provides that in any civil action brought pursuant to the revised chapter 760,
the court may issue an order prohibiting the discriminatory practice at issue
and provide affirmative relief from the effects of that practice, including
back-pay. The court may also award compensatory damages, including, but
not limited to, damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, intangible
injuries, and punitive damages. That section further provides that punitive
damages, where allowed, shall not exceed $100,000.
E. Federal Civil Rights-State Decisions
There have been a number of state court decisions which examined an
employee's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Tookes v. City of Riviera
Beach,'96 a city employee brought a civil rights action against the city
alleging that he was discharged in violation of his due process rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ruled that the trial court erred in
determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the action because the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action.'97
In Sublett v. District School Board of Sumter County,9 ' an employee
brought an action against the school district alleging that his termination
violated § 1983. The trial court entered summary judgment for the school
board concluding that the collective bargaining agreement waived Mr.
Sublett's right to a section 120.57 hearing, and that his failure to take
advantage of his rights under the collective bargaining agreement was fatal
to his claim. The Fifth District reversed and ordered the school board to
194. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(8)(d) (1992). Section 760.10(8) states as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, it is not an unlawful
employment practice under §§ 760.01-. 10 for an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee to: ... (d) [tiake or
fail to take any action on the basis of marital status if that status is prohibited
under its anti-nepotism policy.
Id.
195. Id. § 760.10(9) (1993).
196. 633 So. 2d 566, 567 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
197. Id. at 567-68.
198. 617 So. 2d 374, 376-77 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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afford Mr. Sublett a formal hearing before a hearing officer pursuant to
chapter 120 to determine whether he is subject to discharge from employ-
ment. 99
F. Handicap Discrimination
The Florida Commission on Human Relations recently found evidence
of an employer's discrimination on the basis of a handicap, despite the fact
that the employee's condition did not amount to a handicap under Florida
law. In Deane v. Fleet Transport Co.,200 the hearing officer decided
whether the petition for relief charging the respondent with illegal discrimi-
nation on the basis of a perceived handicap (a history of back surgery and
mild hypertension) should be granted. The hearing officer noted that it was
not clear that the petitioner's history of back injury and mild hypertension
amounted to a handicap. But, the petitioner did state a prima facie case
showing the respondent perceived the petitioner to be handicapped as a
result of the back injury and hypertension. Thus the employer's perception
of Mr. Deane's medical condition as a handicap was deemed sufficient to
support a finding of liability. The Florida Commission on Human Relations
adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact.2"'
In Hart v. Double Envelope Corp.,22 Ms. Hart alleged that Double
Envelope Corporation unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of
a physical handicap (left wrist impairment). The Florida Commission on
Human Relations adopted the findings of the hearing officer, which found
that Ms. Hart had failed to present a prima facie case of handicap discrimi-
nation.20 3 She did not establish that she was handicapped at the time that
she was discharged or that the company knew she had a permanent handicap
or disability at the time she was discharged. The hearing officer also noted
that the employer articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons to
terminate the petitioner. She had repeatedly left work or failed to attend
when she was denied time off.
199. Id. at 377.
200. 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5067 (1993). The hearing officer in his report noted that
the petitioner had the burden to prove a prima facie case of illegal discrimination and decided
the burdens of proof and production of the evidence as set forth in Burdine.
201. Id. at 5068.
202. 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1664, 1671 (1992). The Florida Civil Rights Act does not
define disability or handicap.
203. Id. at 1665.
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The First District Court of Appeal in Brand v. Florida Power
Corp.,204 addressed the burden of proof necessary to establish handicap
discrimination. Prior to Brand, no state court had decided whether the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test applied to a claim asserting handicap
discrimination under Florida's Human Rights Act. The First District Court
of Appeal concluded that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine criteria was
inapplicable and that the preferred criteria were those listed under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.2 °5 In a footnote the court also noted that,
due to its recent enactment, the court was not clear what affect the
American With Disabilities Act of 1990 would have on handicap discrimina-
tion claims prosecuted pursuant to Florida's Human Rights Act.206 The
court speculated that from the examination of certain key provisions in the
ADA, paralleling § 504, Congress intended to extend protection against
handicap discrimination, equal to or greater than that provided by § 504, to
qualified individuals who are handicapped. The court noted that case law
interpreting § 504 would be highly persuasive authority in actions brought
under the ADA to the extent that the two provisions in the acts coin-
cide.20 7
G. Military Leave
The Florida Attorney General considered the question of whether
section 295.09 of the Florida Statutes "require[d] a public employer to hold
a position indefinitely for an employee who takes a leave of absence to
serve on active military duty[.]"2 ° The Attorney General interpreted the
statute to require a "public employer to either reinstate a returning veteran
to the same position held prior to the service in the armed forces or to an
equivalent position, if the veteran exercises his or her reemployment rights
within one year of an honorable discharge from his or her original enlist-
ment.
209
204. 633 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
205. Id. at 507-09; see 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
206. Brand, 633 So. 2d at 510 n.8.
207. Id.
208. 94 Op. Att'y Gen. 9 (1994).
209. Id.
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H. Right to Privacy
In Kurtz v. City of North Miami,21 an applicant for a clerk/typist
position with the city filed a complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of a
regulation requiring all job applicants to sign an affidavit stating that they
had not used tobacco or tobacco products for at least one year immediately
preceding application. The trial court entered summary judgment against the
employee. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the
regulation violated the individual's right to privacy under the state constitu-
tion.2"
I. Public Employees
In McKinney v. Pate," the Eleventh Circuit stated that there is no
substantive due process action available to a government employee who
claims that reasons given for termination were a pretext. The decision
appears to overrule prior law. McKinney involved a full-time and permanent
employee of the Osceola County Building Division who claimed that he was
fired because of personal animosity toward him by one of the Osceola
County Commissioners. The claim was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the jury awarded plaintiff $145,000. The verdict was set aside by the trial
judge, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district
court's opinion 3 and later reheard the case en banc.2 14 Sitting en banc,
the court determined that there was no substantive due process claim
available to the plaintiff and that the court could not find that McKinney's
state-created property right was deserving of substantive due process
215protection.
J. Retaliation
In Wiggins v. Southern Management Corp.,2 6 Lenoria Wiggins
appealed from an order dismissing her complaint. She alleged that she was
210. 625 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 640 So. 2d
1106 (1994).
211. Id. at 902; see FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
212. 20 F.3d 1550, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1994).
213. McKinney v. Pate, 985 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.), vacated, 994 F.2d 772 (11th Cir.
1993).
214. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1550.
215. Id. at 1560-61.
216. 629 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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terminated because she had provided testimony adverse to her employer in
an unemployment compensation hearing and, therefore, this termination
violated section 92.57 of the Florida Statutes. The court noted that the
statute prohibits dismissal of employees who testify in judicial proceedings
in response to a subpoena, but that the statute is not applicable to an
employee who testifies voluntarily and not under subpoena. The court
dismissed the complaint since Ms. Wiggins had testified voluntarily. The
court did state that the unemployment compensation hearings are judicial
proceedings with respect to this statute.1 7
K. School Board Underfunding
In two decisions, during 1994, the Florida Supreme Court denied both
the Florida Education Association and Public Employee Relation petitions
appealing decisions from the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.
In Sarasota County School District v. Sarasota Classifiled/Teacher's
Ass'n 2S and the School Board of Martin County v. Martin County
Education Ass'n, 9 the Florida Supreme Court's denial of review left in
place the district court's decision that school boards have the authority,
pursuant to section 447.309(2) of the Florida Statutes, to underfund
employee contractual salaries.
L. Statute of Limitations
Chapter 95 of the Florida Statutes establishes statutes of limitations
relating to various causes of action. In Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection,
Inc.,220 the court held that a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress occurred no later than the date when the employee
allegedly was forced to resign her employment after enduring several years
of sexual harassment on the job. In Moneyhun v. Vital Industries, Inc.,221
the court held that the limitations period for an employee's quantum meruit
claim began running on the date the employment ended.
217. Id. at 1024.
218. 614 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review dismissed, 630 So. 2d 1095
(Fla. 1994).
219. 613 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), reviewdenied, 632 So. 2d 1027
(1994).
220. 617 So. 2d 428, 428 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
221. 611 So. 2d 1316, 1322 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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M. Unemployment Compensation
In Brown v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,222 the plaintiff was
a legal assistant at an Orlando law firm where she alleged that she was
sexually harassed by a male co-worker over a period of some five months.
She did not report this to her employers, but when they learned of it through
another employee, the firm met with Brown and placed her on paid adminis-
trative leave. They then asked her to return to work and offered to change
her location to the firm's main building where the alleged perpetrator's wife
worked.
She refused to return to work and quit her job after her leave of
absence expired. The court established that an employee who voluntarily
leaves her employment without a reason attributable to her employer, is not
eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits.223 The court
noted, however, that this protects workers of employers who wrongfully
cause their employees to leave their employment. In this case, the court
determined that Ms. Brown failed to show that her voluntary departure from
employment was attributable to the wrongful conduct of her employer.
In Alonso v. Arabel, Inc.,224 an employee appealed the decision of the
Unemployment Appeals Commission barring his appeal as untimely. He
argued that the appeal was untimely because all notices sent were in English
and he did not speak, read, or write English. The court held that reasonable
notice was satisfied when the notice is given in English, and that the
employees had no due process right to notice in language comprehensible
to him.225
The Fifth District in Spangler v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion226 also addressed the issue of whether or not a worker's resignation
was a voluntary departure from work without cause attributable to the
employer. In this particular case, Ms. Spangler was working at a Wal-Mart
store as a night receiving stocker, and was required to work around goods
that were covered with rodent droppings, blood, and urine. She developed
a rash and an upper respiratory illnesses which she thought had been caused
by the unsanitary conditions.
222. 633 So. 2d 36, 39 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
223. Id. at 38; see FLA. STAT. § 443.101(1)(a) (1991).
224. 622 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 622
(Fla. 1994).
225. Id.
226. 632 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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She eventually complained about the conditions, refused to work, and
was sent home without pay. She then resigned from her job. The
Unemployment Appeals Commission denied her unemployment compensa-
tion claim. The Fifth District reversed and remanded, finding that, in this
case, there was nothing she could do to remedy the unsanitary and unhealthy
working conditions which existed, and her employer failed to offer her any
hope of a transfer or other remedy, such as using a mask and gloves.227
N. Unfair Labor Practice
In Sarasota County School District v. Sarasota Classified/Teachers
Ass'n, 2  the Second District Court of Appeal found that a school board
did not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally discontinuing
payment of step-pay increases to classified and instructional employees
during the pendency of negotiations with the union. The court said that the
school board had the right to underfund the agreements and the superinten-
dent properly offered to negotiate the impact of that underfunding.
229
0. Veteran's Preference
Section 295.09 of the Florida Statutes, as amended in 1978, provides
that veteran's preference points are to be awarded on promotional exams
upon the employee's first promotion after reinstatement or reemployment.
The legislature repealed the amendment effective July 5, 1980 and reenacted
the former version of section 295.09 that awarded preference points only to
a veteran's first promotion after reinstatement or reemployment without
230exception.
In Ramirez v. City of Miami,23' the Court of Appeal held that section
295.09 cannot be applied retroactively to award preference points to a
veteran who took a promotional exam and was not promoted before the
statutory amendment was enacted or became effective. In this case, Mr.
Ramirez had been promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1981 and alleged that
he was entitled to an award of veteran's preference points on the results of
his 1977 promotion examination. He also argued that the City of Miami's
failure to award him those points resulted in the wrongful denial of promo-
227. Id. at 99.
228. Sarasota County Sch. Dist., 614 So. 2d at 1143.
229. Id. at 1147-49.
230. Ramirez v. City of Miami, 627 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see
FLA. STAT. § 295.09(I)(a) (1993).
23 1. Ramirez, 627 So. 2d at 49.
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tion to sergeant until 1981. The court said that he was not entitled to
veteran's preference points under section 295.09 of the 1977 Florida
Statutes, and that section 295.09, as amended in 1978, could not be applied
retroactively. 2
P. Whistle-blower
In 1986, the Florida Legislature enacted a Whistle-blower's Act which
was amended in 1991.233 The statute prohibits employers with ten or
more employees from retaliating against an employee if the employee has
disclosed or threatened to disclose to a governmental agency some practice
or policy the company has engaged in that violates a law or regulation. In
1991, the legislature amended the statute to include private employers.234
In Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc.,235 a flight engineer reported a hydraulic
leak on an airplane, against his employer's wishes, and caused a flight to be
grounded. The employee was discharged, and later brought an action for
wrongful termination. The court determined that the statute applied retroac-
tively, thus allowing the employee to pursue his claim for wrongful
termination. The court also made some broad statements about the
employment-at-will doctrine in Florida and noted that the Whistle-blower's
Act is an exception to the at-will doctrine.236 This may be indicative of
the trend in other states that the at-will doctrine is at risk in Florida.
VII. TORTS
Another area of concern for employers in Florida is when an employer
may be found liable for an employee's conduct on a vicarious liability or
respondeat superior theory.
A. Assauli and Battery
In Caprio v. American Airlines, Inc.,23 an employee brought an
action for battery, negligent retention and supervision, and violations of Title
VII against an employer. The action stemmed from alleged sexual
232. Id.
233. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187-.31895 (1993).
234. Id. §§ 448.101-.102.
235. 629 So. 2d 144, 145-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1993), review granted, 639 So. 2d
975 (Fla. 1994).
236. Id. at 148.
237. 848 F. Supp. 1528, 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
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harassment. Judge Kovachevich indicated that there were sufficient issues
of fact to preclude summary judgment, including the employer's alleged
touching of the employee in an offensive manner. She further noted that in
order to state a claim of battery against an employer, the conduct must be
within the scope of employment and be activated, at least in part, by
purposes to serve the employer.238
B. Defamation
In Wagner v. Flanagan,239 a construction contractor brought a
defamation suit against a hospital and its law firm. The center's lawyer sent
a letter to the insurer's lawyer commenting on a fraud committed by the
construction contractor. The court, in addressing the issue of statute of
limitations, stated that the cause of action for defamation accrues on
publication rather than discovery, even where the defamation is private."
Defamation suits normally involve an employee versus employer action
based upon some comments made by the employer. In Jackson v. BellSouth
Mobility, Inc. ,241 a former employee brought an action against an employer
and a manager alleging defamation. The court held that the employee stated
a cause of action against both entities.242
In Tucker v. Resha,243 a taxpayer sued the executive director of the
Florida Department of Revenue for defamation and invasion of their right
to privacy. The court held that the statements that the executive director
made to members of her staff about the taxpayer's "alleged activity in illegal
gun sales, drugs, pornography, money-laundering, and organized crime
involved activities which could include nonpayment of tax or violation of
reporting requirements .... "" Because these disclosures were arguably
within the scope of the executive director's office, and since there is an
absolute privilege accorded this individual, the taxpayer could not recover
for defamation.
238. Id. at 1532.
239. 629 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 1993).
240. Id. at 115.
241. 626 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
242. Id.
243. 634 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
244. Id. at 758.
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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Clifford,245 the assistant store manager observed
an employee of Food Lion consuming food products from the deli. The
employee admitted taking the food, and after concluding that he had
engaged in theft, the store reported the incident to the sheriff's office. Food
Lion terminated the employee and filed with the state an information
charging him with petty theft. The prosecutor later dropped the case and the
employee sued for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court determined that the individual's employer,
though attempting both to obtain civil damages and to bring a criminal
complaint against the plaintiff for alleged theft of food, did not meet the
required level of outrageousness necessary to sustain an action for intention-
al infliction of emotional distress.246
D. Negligent Hiring and Retention
Third parties often try to bring a deep pocket into a lawsuit (i.e., an
employer) by alleging that an employer is liable for the actions of their
employees due to negligent hiring and/or retention. The elements of
negligent hiring are:
1. [T]he employer was required to make an appropriate investigation
of the employee and failed to do so;
2. [A]n appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuit-
ability of the employee for the particular duty to be performed or
for employment in general; and
3. [I]t was unreasonable for the employer to hire the employee in
light of the information he knew or should have known.247
The elements of negligent retention are:
a. The employer was required to exercise reasonable care in the
retention of the employee;
245. 629 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
246. Id. at 203.
247. Garcia v. Duffy,, 492 So. 2d 435, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also
Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In
1993, the Florida Legislature amended section 400.141 of the Florida Statutes to require a
nursing home facility to check the background of certified nursing assistance applicants.
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b. The employer received actual or constructive notice of problems
with the employee's fitness for the particular duty to be performed;
and
c. It was unreasonable for the employer not to investigate or take
corrective action such as discharge or reassignment.24
The claim of negligent hiring or retention centers around the legal duty
of an employer to investigate an employee's background. This will vary
from employer to employer depending upon the nature of the business and
the jobs performed by the individual.
E. Negligent Investigation
Recently, a federal district court decided Vackar v. Package Machinery
Co.,"' in which an employee claimed that the employer had been negli-
gent in investigating the truth of allegedly defamatory statements. The court
granted summary judgment nd stated that the allegations of negligence
were embraced by the plaintiff's defamation claim. The plaintiff, therefore,
could not sue in negligence where the real claim sounded in defamation.250
The court cited no existing case law relating to the tort of negligent
investigation.
F. False Imprisonment
In Stockett v. Tolin,25" ' a female employee brought an action against
her former employer alleging sexual harassment and violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An additional claim brought by the
plaintiff under Florida law was the tort of false imprisonment which is the
unlawful restraint of a person against his will, the unlawful detention of a
person, and deprivation of a person's liberty. The court held that "the act
of pinning the [p]laintiff against a wall and refusing to allow her to escape,
even though only done for a short period of time, was false imprison-
ment.
252
248. Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 441.
249. 841 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
250. Id. at 315.
251. 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
252. Id. at 1556. The court also noted that entering the ladies' restroom constituted an
invasion of her privacy. Id.
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G. Workers' Compensation
As of January 1, 1994, the area in which the state made the most
changes in employer/employee relationships, has been through the workers'
compensation system. The Florida Legislature made significant changes in
the workers' compensation law.
The definition of employer has been expanded to include parties in
actual control of a corporation including, but not limited to, the president,
officers, directors, and shareholders who directly or indirectly own a
controlling interest in the corporation.2 3 The definition of employee has
been amended to include aliens and minors. 4 Additionally, this section
specifically addresses independent contractors and, for all practical purposes,
an independent contractor is deemed to be an employee unless he or she
meets all of the nine specific separate criteria listed in the statute.255
In addition to the statutory changes, there were also a number of
decisions concerning workers' compensation. The Supreme Court of Florida
in Zundell v. Dade County School Board,256 reviewed the following
certified question:
Whether an employer is required to prove the existence of a preexisting
condition in compensation cases involving heart attacks and internal
failures of the cardiovascular system as a prerequisite to the application
of the test for compensability established in Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc.
v. Beasley and Richard E. Mosca & Co., Inc. v. Mosca.2"
The court rephrased the question as follows: "Whether the rule announced
in Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley can ever apply to cardiovascular
injuries occurring on the job when competent substantial medical evidence
show no evidence of a preexisting condition relevant to the injury?) 258
In this case, Mr. Zundell was an algebra teacher who suffered a
hemorrhage of the brain, which he asserted was a result of dealing with a
disruptive student. His subsequent disability forced him into retirement.
253. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(14) (1994).
254. Id. § 440.02(13). It should be noted that the new Act creates an exception to the
criteria enumerated in the statute for certain job classifications listed in the Standard
Industrial Classifications Manual of 1987.
255. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13)(a) (1994).
256. 636 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 1994).
257. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
258. Id. (citation omitted).
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Zundell sought workers' compensation benefits for the incident. His petition
was denied by the Judge of Compensation Claims. A divided First District
Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, affirmed, but certified the question. The
Supreme Court found that the condition was compensable and said that the
facts were essentially indistinguishable from a work place exertion resulting
in a hernia. 9
In Eller v. Shova,26 ° the Florida Supreme Court upheld as constitu-
tional the provision of the workers' compensation act that requires a plaintiff
to establish culpable negligence on the part of the defendant in order to
maintain a civil action against a supervisory or managerial level co-
employee. In this case, Felecia Shova was manager of a Circle K conve-
nience store and was killed during a robbery. Her husband filed a civil
action alleging gross negligence against several management level employ-
ees of Circle K, claiming they knew the store was in a high crime area and
had been robbed many times. The trial court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. The Second District Court of Appeal held that section 440.11(1)
was unconstitutional, and mandatory jurisdiction was vested with the Florida
Supreme Court."' The court reasoned that the worker's compensation
statute is designed to be the exclusive remedy available to an injured
employee as to any negligence on the part of the employer, and quashed the
district court's decision affirming the trial court's dismissal with preju-
dice.262
The First District Court of Appeal recently decided Rolemco Electrical
Contracting v. Sellers.263 Mr. Sellers was involved in an automobile
accident while in the course and scope of his employment with Rolemco.
He had suffered back and neck injuries and an injury to his hip prior to the
automobile accident. He was also suffering from a condition that was
caused by his alcohol consumption but manifested no symptoms. The First
District Court of Appeal reversed the workers' compensation judge's award
of the cost of the employee's total hip replacement. The court held that the
aggravation to the employee's pre-existing condition was not compensable
under the Florida Worker's Compensation Act.2 ' The court noted that
under the statute "accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or
result that happens suddenly, and that "[d]isability ... due to an accidental
259. Id.
260. 630 So. 2d 537, 543 (Fla. 1993).
261. Shova v. Eller, 606 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
262. Eller, 630 So. 2d at 539.
263. 637 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
264. Id. at 316.
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acceleration or aggravation of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol
• . . shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the
employment."265  The court determined that since the employee's pre-
existing condition was caused by his habitual use of alcohol, the resulting
hip replacement surgery was not covered under the workers' compensation
benefits.266
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
One issue that arises in the employment context is whether or not
proceeds from a settlement or jury verdict with respect to an employment
action are taxable. In 1992, the Supreme Court held that payment received
in a settlement of a back-pay claim under Title VII was not excluded from
gross income under section 104(a)(2).2 67 Revenue Ruling 93-88 addressed
the applicability of section 104(a)(2) to claims arising after the amendments
to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.26' The ruling states that
because the amendments authorized the recovery of compensatory damages,
such as emotional distress and mental anguish damages, in cases involving
disparate treatment claims, back-pay, and compensatory awards, these claims
were excluded from gross income. The ruling further states that awards
received from disparate impact discriminations are not excluded.269
An issue may also arise when parties enter into settlement negotiations
as to the tax implications of the allocations of the settlement proceeds. In
McKay v. Commissioner,27 the tax court upheld the parties' allocation of
settlement proceeds in the context of a wrongful discharge action. The
claims were brought for wrongful discharge, breach of an employment
contract, RICO, and punitive damages. The jury awarded $1.6 million for
compensatory damages, and $12.8 million for future damages that was
trebled by the defendant's violation of RICO, and $1.25 million in punitive
damages. The parties negotiated a settlement in which the former employer
agreed to pay $16.7 million to settle all claims. This amount was split
between the wrongful discharge tort claim, breach of contract, and
265. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (1991)).
266. Id.
267. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874 (1992). On December 20, 1993, the
Internal Revenue Service issued a revenue ruling, which addressed the applicability of section
104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code to claims arising after the amendments of Title VII
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
268. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
269. Id.
270. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
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reimbursement of litigation claims. None of the proceeds, however, were
allocated to RICO or punitive damages. The tax court upheld the allocation
of proceeds in the agreement and noted that the allocations were consistent
with the taxpayer's pleadings and the verdict which reflected a lawsuit
primarily in tort.27' Thus, it is crucial for both employers and employees
to receive tax planning advice with respect to the settlement of any action
and the allocation of settlement proceeds.
IX. CONCLUSION
The waters of employment law in Florida are potentially hazardous for
both employees and employers. Both should be ever mindful that their
actions or inactions are governed by local, state, or federal laws; decisions
by local, state or federal court, and state or federal administrative agencies.
271. Id. at487.
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